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CONSUMER SENSITIVITY TO INTEREST RATES: 
AN EMPilUCAL STUDY OF NEW-CAR BUYERS 
AND AUTO LOANS 
James J. White* and Frank W. Munger, Jr.** 
!. lNTRODUCilON 
ALTHOUGH it has never been clear whether the consumer needs to be protected from his own folly or from the rapaciousness 
of those who feed on him, consumer protection is a topic of intense 
current interest in the courts, in the legislatures, and in the law 
schools. A number of recent court decisions have attempted to at-
tack problems confronting the consumer;1 unfortunately, these judi-
cial efforts have succeeded primarily in disclosing the limitations 
in the courts' ability to deal with such problems. State and federal 
legislative bodies have pursued more carefully designed remedies. 
Congress has passed the Truth-in-Lending Act;2 the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has proposed the 
Uniform Consumer Credit Code;3 and many states have enacted 
retail installment sales acts4 to update and supplement their long-
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I. See, e.g., the landmark decisions in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 
!150 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967). See also 
Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528, 236 A.2d 843 (1967); American Home 
Improvement, Inc. v. Madver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964); and cases cited in 
Annot., 17 AL.R.3d 1010, 1136-38 (1968). 
2. Consumer Credit Protection Act, May 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146, 
15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-77 (Supp. V, 1965-1969) [hereinafter CCPA]. 
!l. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CoDE (rev. final draft 1969) [hereinafter UCCC]. The 
UCCC has been adopted by Colorado, H. 1076, [1971] Colorado Laws (1 CCH CoN-
SUMER CREDIT GUIDE 11 4770, at 5005 (1971)); Idaho, ch. 299, (1971] Idaho Laws (1 CCH 
CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 11 4770, at 5005 (1971)); Indiana, IND. CODE 1971, tit. 24, art. 4.5, 
§§1-101 to 6-202; Oklahoma, 14 OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 14A, §§ 1-101 to 9-103 (Supp. 
1970); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 70B-l-101 to -9-103 (Supp. 1969); and Wyoming, ch. 
191, (1971] Wyoming Laws (1 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 1! 4770, at 5005 (1971)). 
4. See, e.g., the Michigan Retail Installment Sales Act enacted in 1966, MICH. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 19.416(101) to (122) (Supp. 1971). Thirty-two states have installment sales acts 
covering most consumer goods (including motor vehicles), as compiled in scattered 
sections of the CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE under the respective state headings: 
Alaska, Calif., Colo., Conn., Del., Fla., Ga., Hawaii, Ill., Ind., Kan., Ky., Md., Mass., 
Mich., Mo., Mont., Neb., Nev., N.J., N.M., N.Y., N.D., Ohio, Okla., Ore., Pa., R.I., 
Texas, Utah, Vt., '\\Tash. Thirteen states and the District of Columbia have acts 
covering only motor vehicles. See CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE under the following 
headings: Ariz., D.C., Iowa, La., Me., Minn., Miss., N.H., N.C., S.C., S.D., Va., W. 
[ 1207] 
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standing usury laws. 5 These legisJative and judicial acts have always 
relied, at best, on anecdotal knowledge of consumer behavior. In 
this Article we offer the results of an empirical study of a small 
slice of consumer behavior in the use of installment credit.6 
Va., Wis. One state, Tennessee, has an installment sales act covering most consumer 
goods except motor vehicles. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-11-101 to -110 (1964). See 3 CCH 
CoNsmrER CREDIT GumE 1111 6001-19, at 50,611-15 (1970). Only four states have no 
installment sales act covering consumer goods: Ala., Ark., Idaho, "Wyo. In addition, 
every state but Arkansas has enacted some form of legislation regulating small loans 
to consumers. E.g., M1cH. STAT. ANN .. §§ 23.667(1)·(26) (1971). See chart in 1 CCH 
CoNSU?.rER CREDIT GUIDE 1J 540, at 1603-35 (1970). And 41 states regulate installment 
loans to consumers under separate statutes. E.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 23.710(19l)(c), 
(192), (196) (1971). See chart in I CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 11 570, at 1901-31 
(1971). 
5. Legislative concern for the consumer debtor is not entirely a modern develop· 
ment. Usury laws have been in effect for many years in virtually every jurisdiction. 
A good example is the Illinois law, enacted in 1879, Law of May 24, 1879, §§ 1-12, 
[1879] Ill. Laws 184-86, amended by Law of June 17, 1891, §§ 1-8, [1891] Ill. Laws 
149-50, codified in ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 74, §§ 1-11 (Smith-Hurd 1966). A typical 
usury law specifies a maximum rate of simple interest-or a maximum number of 
dollars per $100 of principal that may be charged per annum-and a separate 
(usually higher) rate for loans under written contract. The older usury statutes 
usually do not define interest, and few specifically mention installment loan rates. 
Since these older usury statutes have operated to limit only "interest" rates and not 
other charges that were effectively interest on the money borrowed but were not 
termed interest charges in the loan agreement, the practice in making installment 
loans has been to assess "financing'' or "carrying" charges in addition to "interest." 
See, e.g., Petersen v. Philco Fin. Corp., 91 Idaho 644, 428 P.2d 961 (1967); Sloan v. 
Sears, Roebuck &: Co., 228 Ark. 464, 308 S.W.2d 802 (1957). More recent installment 
sales acts and installment loan acts have been drafted specifically to include any 
type of charge, regardless of what it is called by the lender or seller, within the 
maximum rate and disclosure provisions of those acts. For example, the UCCC uses 
the term "credit service charge" instead of interest; the credit service charge is the 
sum of all direct and indirect charges incident to the extension of credit. UCCC 
§ 2.109. 
6. Several empirical studies of consumer behavior in credit transactions already 
exist; economists have authored most of them. See A. BROIDA, CONSUMER SURVEYS AS A 
SOURCE OF INFORMATION FOR SOCIAL ACCOUNTING: THE PROBLEMS (1962); G. HABERLER, 
CONSU?.rER INSTALLMENT CREDIT AND ECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS (1942); F. JUSTER, HOUSE· 
HOLD CAPITAL FORMATION AND FINANCING, 1897-1962 (1966); F. JUSTER 8: R:. SHAY, CON· 
SUMER SENSITIVITY TO FINANCE RATES: AN EMPIRICAL AND ANALYTICAL INVESI'IGATION 
(1964); G. KATONA, THE POWERFUL CONSUMER (1960); A. K.lssELGOFF, FACTORS AFFECT· 
ING THE DEMAND FOR CONSU?.rER INSTALLMENT SALES CREDIT (1952); ·w. MoRS, CONSUMER 
CREDIT FINANCE CHARGES: RATE INFORMATION AND QUOTATION (1965); W. MORS, CoN· 
SUMER CREDIT THEORIES: A HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL ANALYSIS (1944); OPINION REsEARCH 
CORP., NEW DIMENSIONS IN FULL SERVICE BANKING (1966); R. SHAY, NEW AUTOMOBILE 
FINANCE RATES 1942-62 (1963); UNIV. OF MICHIGAN SURVEY REsEARCH CENTER, NOVEMBER 
1959 INTERIM SURVEY (1959); Due, Consumer Knowledge of Installment Credit Charges, 
20 J. MARKETING 162 (1955); Friedman, Using Simulation Techniques To Predict the 
Behavioral Effects of New Laws: The Case of Truth-In-Lending Legislation and the 
Consumer, 54 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 297 (1970); L. Hoskins, Interest Rates Paid for Auto-
mobile Credit by San Francisco Bay Area Families, Sept. 1958 (unpublished M.A. 
thesis, Univ. of Calif.). To our knowledge, no one has examined the behavior of a 
group of borrowers in actual transactions. But see Friedman, supra. For a more thor-
ough discussion of the several relevant empirical studies-which we will not review 
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In their recent efforts, the legislatures, by imposing new interest 
rate disclosure requirements on installment lenders, 7 have sought 
to protect the consumer against pressures to borrow money at a 
higher rate of interest than he can afford or need pay. The hope, 
if not the expectation, of the drafters of such disclosure legislation 
is that the consumer who is made aware of interest rates will seek 
here-see ·w. MORS, CONSUMER CREI>rr FINANCE CHARGES: RATE INFORMATION AND QUO-
TATION (1965). In addition, economic literature contains a wealth of speculation about 
the use of information by consumers and an equal amount of empirical data that 
bears indirectly on the question whether finance rates are an important determinant 
in the use of credit. For example, A. KlsSELGOFF, supra, presents an analysis, using 
aggregate data for the United States, of the effects of such factors as loan rate, down 
payment, and loan term on the use of credit. His data were unsatisfactory to explain 
why consumers, or certain consumers, do not respond to particular variables. But he 
was able to show that, while changes in down-payment size and interest rates on new-
car loans did not have a systematic effect on the aggregate purchases of new cars 
during the period he studied (1929-1941), the length of loan term did have such an 
effect. This finding is amply supported by more detailed survey data collected sub-
sequently. 
7. The disclosure provisions of the UCCC and the CCPA are virtually identical. 
In general, the creditor must disclose the dollar amounts to be charged a debtor, the 
credits for amounts already paid, a description or identification of the amounts, 
and the amounts charged in terms of a percentage of the principal. See UCCC 
§§ 2.301-.313, 3.301-.312; CCPA §§ 121-29, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1631-39 (Supp. V, 1965-1969). 
Both acts require that the percentage rate that is quoted to the consumer be calcu-
lated strictly in accordance with regulations adopted by the Federal Reserve Board. 
UCCC §§ 2.304, 3.304; CCPA § 107, 15 U.S.C. § 1606 (Supp. V, 1965-1969). The "per-
centage rate" is the equivalent simple annual interest rate computed according to 
one of several methods in common use by accountants prior to either act; the Federal 
Reserve Board has now published tables that can be used in stating this equivalent 
rate. See Bd. of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.5 
(1970), and Annual Percentage Rate Tables for Truth-in-Lending Reg. Z (1969). The 
purpose in requiring a creditor or seller to state the charges on the loan in terms 
of simple annual interest is to allow a consumer to make intelligent comparisons be-
tween different creditors and alternate forms of financing that were not directly 
comparable prior to the acts unless one had a sophisticated knowledge of principles 
of accounting. The CCPA further requires use of certain terminology, size of lettering, 
and format in making the disclosure. CCPA § 122, 15 U.S.C. § 1632 (Supp. V, 1965-1969), 
and Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.6(a), G), 226.7(b)-(c), 226.8(c)-(d) (1970). The UCCC con-
tains no such provisions. 
The UCCC is also designed to remove existing barriers to competition among 
lenders; it is intended to replace a multiplicity of acts that now regulate different 
segments of the consumer loan market in most states. The repeal of prior acts would 
remove most licensing requirements for lenders now in the market, except those for 
banks and credit unions and similar institutions, and would allow new lenders to 
enter the loan and installment sales credit markets almost without restriction. The 
only constraint on entry contained in the UCCC is the requirement that persons en-
gaged in the business of making loans to consumers at rates of interest higher than 
183 be licensed. UCCC §§ 3.201, 3.501-.502. Comments and discussion attending the 
drafting of these provisions make it clear that licensing is intended to be pro forma 
except in cases in which an applicant is likely to be unscrupulous or irresponsible. 
The clear intent of the drafters was to maximize competition through free entry 
into the market at every level. See Curran &: Fand, An Analysis of the Uniform Con-
sumer Credit Code, 49 NEB. L. REv. 727, 728-35 (1970). 
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the lowest-priced lender or will decide not to borrow.8 This migra-
tion of the consumers to the lowest-priced lender will, so the argu-
ment goes, require the higher-priced lender to reduce his rate in 
order to retain his business.9 These hopes and expectations are 
founded on the proposition that the consumer is largely ignorant 
of the interest rate that he pays; this ignorance presumably keeps 
him from going to a lender with cheaper rates. Knowledge of in-
terest rates, it is believed, will rectify this defect and will make the 
consumer credit market much more nearly perfect. 
Even on its face, the assumption that consumer debtors will make 
use of credit-cost information is open to serious question.10 The 
typical consumer often shops first for the good he wishes to buy 
and is psychologically sold on that good before he even considers 
the terms of his purchase agreement.11 Current disclosure laws do 
not require sellers to advertise their rates; they require only that 
information be provided on the face of the loan contract.12 If the 
credit-cost information is not available until after the consumer has 
decided to buy, under what circumstances will the buyer use dif-
ferences in interest rates to his advantage? If consumers using credit 
are largely insensitive to rate differences even when they are aware 
of those differences, disclosure legislation holds out a false hope. A 
8. Johnson, Regulation of Finance Charges on Consumer Instalment Credit, 66 
MICH. L. R:Ev. 81 (1967); Shay, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code: An Economist's 
View, 54 CoRNELL L. R:Ev. 491 (1969). 
9. CCPA § 102, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (Supp. V, 1965-1969), states: 
The Congress finds that economic stabilization would be enhanced and the com-
petition among the various financial institutions and other firms engaged in the 
extension of consumer credit would be strengthened by the informed use of credit. 
The informed use of credit results from an awareness of the cost thereof by con-
sumers. It is the purpose of this subcbapter to assure a meaningful disclosure of 
credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various 
credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit. 
IO. Professors Jordan and Warren acknowledge that some consumers undoubtedly 
use information about finance rates to their advantage but argue that there are situa-
tions in which such information will provide little or no help to consumers seeking 
credit. Jordan&: Warren, Disclosure of Finance Charges: A Rationale, 64 MICH. L. REv. 
1285, 1302-03, 1321 (1966). 
11. A second case described by Professors Jordan and Warren is one in which an 
unsophisticated or uneducated consumer is not likely to take advantage of the infor-
mation that is provided for his use because he does not understand the technical 
format of the information or does not understand how to use such information. 
Jordan &: Warren, supra note 10, at 1303, 1306-07. A third case they suggest is the 
"marginal" consumer, the consumer who must go heavily into debt in order to pur-
chase items he considers necessary because he lacks liquid assets required for other 
types of financing and is therefore less likely to avoid bad bargaining because the 
amount saved by shopping for credit appears small beside the amount of his total 
outstanding debt. Id. at 1321. 
12. See, e.g., UCCC §§ 2-302, 3-302; CCPA §§ 128(b), 129(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1638(b), 
1639(b) (Supp. V, 1965-1969). 
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principal purpose of the study on which this Article is based, there-
fore, was to test the hypothesis that consumers are insensitive to 
interest rates. 
Presumably, consumers in a perfect market will behave like water 
in a pond, which gravitates to the lowest point-i.e., consumer 
borrowers should all tum to the lender that gives the cheapest loan.13 
We began this project with a strong suspicion-based on the obser-
vations of others14-that the consumer credit market is far from 
perfect and that water governed by the force of gravity is a poor 
metaphor with which to describe the behavior of consumer debtors. 
The consumer debtor's choice of creditor clearly involves consid-
eration of many factors besides interest rate. Therefore, a metaphor 
that better describes our suspicions about the borrower's behavior 
in a market in which rate differences appear involves a group of 
monkeys in a cage with a new baboon of unknown temperament. 
The baboon squats in one comer of the cage near some choice, ripe 
bananas. In the far comer of the cage is a supply of wilted greens 
and spoiled bananas, the monkeys' usual fare. Some of the monkeys 
continue eating their usual fare because they are unaware of the 
new bananas and the visitor. Other monkeys observe the new bananas 
but do not approach them. Still others, more daring or intelligent 
than the rest, seek ways of snatching an occasional banana from the 
baboon's stock. The baboon strikes at all the brown monkeys but 
he permits black monkeys to eat without interference. Yet many 
of the black monkeys make no attempt to eat. One suspects that 
a social scientist who interviewed the members of the monkey tribe 
about their experience would find that many of those who saw and 
appreciated the choice bananas would be unable to articulate the 
reasons for their failure to eat any of them. The social scientist 
might also discover that a few who looked at the baboon in obvious 
fright would nevertheless deny that they were afraid. In addition, 
he might find that some were so busy picking fleas or nursing that 
they did not observe the choice bananas at all. We suspected that 
consumer borrowers had similarly diverse reasons for their behavior. 
We presumed that some paid high interest rates only because of 
13. Such a hypothesis is discussed and modifications suggested by Jordan &: Warren, 
supra note 10, and Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44 N.Y.U. 
L. REY. I (1969). Modified versions of the perfect-market hypothesis, which proceeds 
on the assumption that the consumer knows and uses loan cost in selecting his 
creditor, are discussed and tested empirically in F. JUSTER&: R. SHAY, supra note 6. 
14. E.g., F. JUSTER &: R. SHAY, supra note 6; Jordan &: Warren, supra note 10, at 
1303-04. 
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ignorance of lower rates and that others correctly concluded that 
they could not qualify for a cheaper loan than they received. 
Others, we suspected, were merely too lazy or too fearful of bankers 
to seek lower rates. 
To put the foregoing more precisely, our three major working 
hypotheses were the following: 
(1) Many of those borrowing at high rates of interest could 
have procured the same loans in the same market at lower rates. 
(2) Lack of knowledge that others offered loans at lower rates 
was among the least significant of the barriers to acquiring a loan 
at a lower rate. 
(3) Debtors who sought loans at the lowest rate of interest 
may be distinguished as a group on the basis of social, educa-
tional, and economic indicators from those who did not seek low-
cost loans. 
To test these hypotheses, we examined a sample of persons who had 
obtained automobile loans in a money market in which there was 
significant competition among lenders. 
II. A DESCRIPTION OF THE SURVEY 
In the course of our survey, we interviewed a sample of persons 
residing in Washtenaw County, Michigan, who borrowed money to 
purchase new cars during the last 6 months of 1967.15 We chose loans 
against automobiles partly because some data on the actual trans-
actions were readily available in security agreements on file at the 
county register of deeds office.16 For the typical auto loan, the institu-
tion lending the money takes a security interest in the car and 
perfects that interest by filing a :financing statement with the local 
register of deeds. The practice in Washtenaw County is for creditors 
to file a copy of the actual security agreement as a financing state-
ment. The security agreement sets forth the terms of the contract: 
the down payment, the cash price, the time balance and finance 
charge, the cost of insurance, the size of the monthly payment, the 
loan terms, the rate of interest, and the car make and year. The 
15. The questionnaire used is reprinted as Appendix A to this Article. 
16. Under Michigan law, a creditor must file a financing statement in the county 
of his debtor's residence in order to perfect a security interest in an :r.utomobile. 
MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 19.9302(3)-(4), 19.9401 (1964); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 9.1858(2) (1968). 
For a schedule of the information that we obtained from the security agreements, see 
Appendix B infra. 
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security agreement also discloses whether the car dealer signed the 
loan contract. A second reason for choosing auto loans was that such 
loans are among the largest a consumer ever seeks: it is likely that 
auto loans involve the largest amounts--apart from a home mort-
gage loan-that a consumer undertakes to borrow in his lifetime. 
Hence, if the rate of interest were ever to make a difference to a 
consumer, it should be in this context, where a differential of one 
or two percentage points in an add-on rate can amount to several 
hundred dollars in interest cost.17 If the consumer will not seek the 
lowest interest rates on a $3,000 loan, he is far less likely to shop for 
a low rate on a loan of $100 or $200. In addition to these reasons, 
some available empirical evidence suggests that persons borrowing 
large amounts of money-on the order of $1,000 to $2,000-remem-
ber the interest rate on their loans with greater accuracy than do 
those borrowing smaller amounts.18 
Under Michigan law, the maximum interest rate that one may 
charge on an installment loan made to finance the purchase of a new 
car or a used car less than one year old is $6/100 "add-on."19 The 
add-on charge may be computed with the following formula: Total 
charge = H X I X Y. In the formula, H represents the number of 
hundreds of dollars of principal, I represents the dollars per $100 
interest, and Y represents the number of years of the loan. To illus-
trate, assume there is a $6/100 add-on charge on a $2,000 loan re-
payable in 36 monthly installments. The total charge will be 20 (the 
number of hundreds of dollars of principal) times 6 (dollars per $100 
interest) times 3 (the number of years)-i.e., 20 X 6 X 3 = $360. The 
total of $2,360 is then divided by 36 (the number of months in 3 
years) to derive the debtor's monthly installment payment of $65.56. 
Here the $6/100 add-on interest is equivalent to an effective simple 
annual interest rate of about 11.253.20 
17. A new·car buyer seeking a $3,000 loan will pay 63 of $3,000, or $180 a year, 
for the lifetime of the loan if he borrows at the rate of $6/100 add-on. (For a com-
plete explanation of the meaning of "add-on," see text accompanying notes 19 &: 20 
infra.) A new-car buyer with a $3,000 loan paying a rate of $4.50/100 add-on will pay 
4.53 of $3,000, or $135 per year. Most new-car loans are made for a period of 3 
years; thus the difference between the two rates means a difference in interest cost 
of $135 (3 X $45) over the lifetime of the loan. 
18. F. JUSTER &: R. SHAY, supra note 6, at 33-40. Juster and Shay found that in a 
sample of 16,000 Consumer's Union members, accurate recall of interest rates in-
creased with the size of the loan. 
19. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 23.628(18) (1971). 
20. Several methods of converting add-on rates to simple annual interest rates 
were in common use prior to passage of the CCP A. The CCP A and the UCCC 
adopted a uniform rule, known as the "actuarial" method, for conversion to simple 
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During 1967, most of the lenders in Washtenaw County loaned 
money for new cars at $6/100 add-on. Two of the largest lenders 
were of particular interest: Ann Arbor Bank (AAB), the largest bank 
in the county and the holder of the most automobile paper of any 
bank in the county,21 and General Motors Acceptance Corporation 
(GMAC), the :financing subsidiary of General Motors. We were 
interested in GMAC because we were told that it would take greater 
risks and lend to less solid debtors than would the banks.22 Both of 
these lenders reputedly loaned to most new-car buyers at $6/100 add-
on. Also lending money in Washtenaw County was a smaller bank, 
Huron Valley National Bank (HVNB), which loaned money at $4.50 / 
100 in 1967 (8.53 simple interest on a 3-year loan). This bank, the 
newest in Ann Arbor, started its operations in 1963 and was con-
ducting a vigorous advertising campaign in 1967 in an effort to at-
tract automobile loan customers. An illustration of the type of adver-
tising used by HVNB is attached as Appendix C. 
GMAC purchased its paper from dealers or received it through 
dealer referrals, and AAB acquired most of its paper in the same way; 
but HVNB wrote almost all of its own paper in the form of direct 
loans. Because it loaned directly to the consumer, HVNB avoided 
one usual lender's cost-the :finder fee or kickback commonly paid 
to dealers who sell paper.23 We assumed that both banks and GMAC 
were part of the market in auto loans because all did business in 
Ann Arbor, the largest city in the county; nearly all of the residents 
of the county live within a few minutes' drive of Ann Arbor. HVNB 
has branches only in Ann Arbor; AAB has branches in Ann Arbor 
and in one other city 8 miles away; and GMAC makes loans through 
all General Motors dealers. 
Using the Washtenaw County Register of Deeds records of :financ-
ing statements filed in the last 6 months of 1967, we drew samples 
annual interest. The equivalent simple annual interest rates given in the text are 
taken from the Annual Percentage Rate Tables published by the Federal Reserve 
Board (see note 7 supra) and are those which would be required under the two acts. 
See w. MoRS, CONSUMER CREDrr FrNANCE CHARGES: RATE INFORMATION AND QUOTATION 
(1965); W. WILLIER & F. HART, CoNSUMER CREDIT HANDBOOK 163 (1969). 
21. All the bank loan officers with whom we talked believed that Ann Arbor Bank 
[hereinafter AAB] held the most automobile paper. We know of no public records 
that confirm or refute their judgment. 
22. Before beginning our survey, we talked with loan officers at several banks in 
Ann Arbor to find out about local interest rates and kickbacks, as well as their views 
of the market. 
23. For a brief discussion of dealer-bank financing arrangements, see White, Repre· 
senting the Low Income Consumer in Repossession, Resales and Deficiency Judgment 
Cases, 64 Nw. U. L. REv. 808, 834 & n.92 (1970). 
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for each of the 3 lenders.24 Personal interviews were conducted 
during 1968, and most were completed by the end of that summer. 
Altogether we interviewed 235 respondents, with a response rate of 
663.25 Twenty-two per cent of the sample was never contacted by 
an interviewer, and 123 refused to be interviewed. Our respondents 
constitute a "stratified" sample, not statistically representative of all 
persons borrowing to buy new cars in 1967 in the county, but repre-
sentative of the buyers borrowing through HVNB, AAB, and 
GMAC. Constructing the sample in this way allowed us to make 
statistically valid comparisons between selected banks that, we 
thought, were likely to lend to different types of customers. We think 
the sample, taken as a whole, is also a fair cross-section of the new-
car buyers in the county, and we believe it can be used for descrip-
tive purposes as if it were representative. 
24. The sampling procedure was complex and a trifle sloppy. The register of deeds 
places financing statements in sequentially numbered files in the order of filing. By 
going through the files for the last 6 months of 1967, we obtained lists of 1013 debtors 
of AAB, 746 debtors of General Motors Acceptance Corporation [hereinafter GMAC], 
and 381 debtors of Huron Valley National Bank [hereinafter HVNB]. The samples 
drawn from these lists (1/6 samples from the AAB and GMAC lists and a 1/3 sample 
from the HVNB list) did not make allowance for "trash"-financing statements that 
covered security interests in merchandise other than new cars. After the trash was 
removed, we drew a second sample from each of the lists so that the total number 
of new-car buyers borrowing from each of the 3 creditors approximated the desired 
sizes. The final sample from AAB numbered 134; that from GMAC, 117; that from 
HVNB, 109. Theoretically, the second samples drawn from each of the lists violate 
the rule of equiprobability sampling because each of these respondents had a slightly 
greater chance of being included in the final combined sample. Although our proce-
dure does not conform to the most desirable survey-sampling practice, it is unlikely 
that the error has rendered the sample unrepresentative in any way. 
25. The response rate is calculated by dividing the number of respondents who 
consented to be interviewed by the total number of borrowers in our sample (after 
we excluded any nonsample respondents). Nonsample respondents are persons who, 
contrary to the information available from the financing statement, in fact were not 
financing through one of the banks in which we were interested or who were not 
financing new cars. Two respondents who refused to complete an interview that had 
been begun arc counted as having been interviewed for the purposes of calculating 
the response rate. 
FINAL STATUS OF SURVEY SAMPLE 
GMAC AAB HVNB Total 
Interviews 69 ( 59.03) 103 ( 77.03) 64( 59.03) 236 (65.53) 
Refusals 23 ( 19.73) IO ( 7.43) 11 ( 10.13) 44 (12.23) 
Never Contacted 25 ( 21.43) 21 ( 16.03) 34( 31.23) 80 (22.23) 
Total• 117 (100.13) 134 (100.43) 109 (100.33) 360 (99.93) 
• Because percentage figures have been rounded off, the printed figures do not nec-
essarily total 100.03. 
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III. MOST RESPONDENTS WHO BORROWED AT THE 
MAXIMUM LEGAL RATE COULD HAVE BORROWED 
AT A LOWER RATE 
If the new-car loan market in Washtenaw County were a perfect 
market in which lenders were distributed by reference to a single 
variable-money cost-then one would expect the high-priced lend-
ers to serve the high-risk debtors and the low-priced lenders to serve 
the low-risk debtors. In 1967 there was significant rate competition 
in the new-car loan market. HVNB made all but an insignificant 
number of its loans at $4.50/100, while GMAC and AAB made all 
but a small number of their loans at $6/100, a rate Vs higher than 
HVNB's rate. The magnitude of this rate difference is illustrated 
by the corresponding $135 difference in the cost of a $3,000 loan 
over 3 years. 26 
To test the hypothesis that many borrowers who were low risks 
and would have qualified for the $4.50/100 rate had in fact borrowed 
at the $6/100 rate, we asked the HVNB loan officer who actually 
made the final decision on HVNB loans in 1967 to pass on 48 
hypothetical loan applicants.27 Among these 48 were the cases of 38 
persons whom we had interviewed and who had in fact borrowed 
from AAB (18 cases) or from GMAC (20 cases) in 1967. Six were 
persons who had actually borrowed from HVNB in 1967 and 4 were 
fictitious cases. 
In each of the AAB- or GMAC-borrower cases presented to the 
HVNB loan officer, we knew, on the basis of the interview or the 
security agreement that had been filed, the debtor's income, job 
history, general financial status, the kind of car that he had pur-
chased in 1967, and the terms of the loan that he had procured at 
that time. We could not present the debtor in the flesh for a personal 
interview with the loan officer, nor could we provide a reference from 
a current creditor of the debtor.28 However, we were able to give the 
loan officer all the other data that he would normally use to decide 
26. See note 17 supra. 
27. Out of consideration for the loan officer's schedule, we set an arbitrary maximum 
of 50 on the number of cases presented to him. We first selected every tenth AAB 
interview (in order of completion) and every fifth GMAC interview. That process pro-
duced 10 of each, or samples of about 103 and 153, respectively. After making a 
decision to double this number, we selected every tenth-plus-one AAB interview and 
every fifth-plus-one GMAC interview. The procedure was, for our purposes, satisfac-
tory to give us a representative subsample of interviews from the 2 banks. 
28. A "routine check" of credit references at HVNB meant telephoning 1 or 2 
current or recent creditors (preferably creditors from the immediate area) to obtain 
information about the loan applicant's payment history. 
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whether to loan and on what terms to make a loan.29 It will come as 
no surprise that the debtor's disposable income and his job stability 
were the two most important considerations for the loan offi.cer.30 
Other relevant factors he normally considers were as diverse as 
whether the debtor had had a recent divorce,31 his general appear-
ance,32 his education, and the type of car that he wished to purchase.33 
29. The terms of each debtor's actual loan were available to us from the security 
agreements that the creditor filed with the register of deeds and from which we 
initially obtained the respondent's name. For each hypothetical case, the HVNB loan 
officer indicated the amount and type of loan that he would have made in 1967 to 
the persons we described. To the best of his ability under the circumstances, he also 
indicated what factors were important in making each decision. Since the loan officer 
had no opportunity to interview any debtor and since he had to put himself in the 
frame of mind that he had in 1967 in a different credit market, his judgment about 
what he would have done in 1967 is probably not entirely accurate. Furthermore, he 
stipulated that he was proceeding on the assumption that the debtor could produce 
credit references to verify some of the information. Despite these difficulties, the loan 
officer believed he was able to approximate closely what he would have done with 
each of the loan applications in 1967. 
30. The factors that influence the loan-making decisions of AAB and GMAC are 
probably the same as those that influence HVNB. Both AAB and GMAC do a high· 
volume business in car loans and lend on the basis of information telephoned to them 
by dealers-nearly all of GMAC's and more than % of AAB's new-car loan business 
is conducted in this manner. On the other hand, HVNB considers itself a more cau-
tious, low-volume lender in the new-car loan market and interviews all of its potential 
debtors. Nevertheless, differences, if any, in the types of customers to whom the 2 banks 
and GMAC lend are almost certainly the result of the lenders' respective decisions 
to take more or fewer risks rather than the result of different weights attributed to 
particular characteristics of buyers. 
31. A recent divorce indicates the possibility of liability for alimony or child-support 
payments or of more general financial difficulty, from which, in the opinion of the 
loan officer, divorces frequently stem. 
32. In the course of drafting this section, the following exchange of footnotes took 
place: 
(White's proposed footnote) When the loan officer described neat personal ap· 
pearance as a desirable debtor attribute, one of your authors, whose appearance 
that day could most charitably be described as slovenly, went into an uncontrol· 
!able fit of petting and grooming his mane. 
(Munger's substitution) Your other author is a member of the Air National 
Guard and under its vigilant eye has never let more than a quarter-inch of hair 
show at one time. We understand his caution has been rewarded by several favor· 
able loans! 
In any event, while the potential impact of appearance and other such subtle factors 
on chances for obtaining a loan seem important, we were unable to measure them 
adequately. Our conclusions therefore should be considered in light of the effect such 
factors could have on an actual loan application. See note 69 infra. 
33. The loan officer expressed the following reasons for considering the type of 
car a borrower wanted to purchase. The typical car buyer should be looking for a 
car that fits his budget and that will be serviceable for some time. The more practical 
the choice of car appears to be, the more certain the loan officer can be of the person's 
potential reliability in making future payments. Conversely, a car that is flashy, fad· 
dish, or generally too large for the customer's budget may indicate temporary 
enthusiasm, may foretell future loss of interest in paying for a status symbol, and 
may warn that the buyer will default shortly before leaving town. The loan officer 
said that when making loans for luxury cars or for sports cars, he often required as 
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Each of these last-mentioned factors took a back seat in the loan 
officer's mind to income, job security, and at least one credit refer-
ence. 
Having put himself in his 1967 frame of mind, the HVNB loan 
officer gave us his best estimate of the maximum amount he would 
have loaned in 1967 to each of our 48 potential borrowers. A most 
interesting finding is that he would have loaned money to 36 of the 
38 persons who procured loans at GMAC and AAB; he found only 
2 of them to be totally unworthy of credit (see Table l). Of course, 
the fact that he would have loaned some money to each of the other 
36 does not mean that each of them could have procured a satisfac-
tory loan from HVNB, for in some cases he would have required a 
much higher down payment than that required by the higher-priced 
lenders; it is probable that some of these borrowers did not have the 
resources to come up with additional down-payment money. How-
ever, as Table I discloses, HVNB would have made at least the same 
loan as the higher-priced lenders made or would have required less 
than $100 additional down payment in 453 of the GMAC cases and 
in 393 of the AAB cases.34 These results indicate that if all or nearly 
all of them could have come up with an additional $100 down pay-
ment, more than 423 of the AAB and GMAC customers could have 
procured a nearly identical loan at HVNB at a rate % lower than 
the one they were paying. If GMAC and AAB borrowers could have 
come up with an additional $250 down payment, then more than 
603 of them could have qualified for a $4.50/100 loan at HVNB. 
Whether the HVNB loan officer in fact would have made the 
loans on the terms that he described, we have no way of know-
much as ~ of the price down, whereas the normal minimum down payment was 
about 203 of the price. Apparently because of such caution there had been only 6 
to 8 repossessions on 6000 outstanding loans during the 6 months preceding the 
interview. 
34. In the remainder of this Article, we concern ourselves primarily with trying 
to explain why persons who could have borrowed at HVNB did not do so. We assume 
that a person first decides what kind of car he wants and then looks for a loan. Some-
one wishing to purchase an expensive car in 1967 on a moderate or small income 
was required to pay a large down payment in order to obtain a loan through HVNB 
(see note 33 supra). We were told by some respondents and by bank loan officers with 
whom we spoke before conducting our survey that GMAC offered "easy credit,'' that 
is, that GMAC accepted low down payments on expensive cars even if the borrower's 
income was moderate. If this is true, a borrower buying a large car on a small income 
and wishing to make a normal or small down payment is effectively limited in the 
number of lenders to which he may turn. Our data show that more than 503 of the 
cars financed by GMAC in Washtenaw County in 1967 cost over $3,000 and that 
fewer than 503 of the cars financed by AAB and HVNB cost $3,000 or more. In addi-
TABLE 1 
TABULATION OF ACTUAL AND HYPOTHETICAL AVERAGE LOANS FOR 38 CASES PRESENTED TO CREDIT MANAGERS 
HVNB Down HVNB Down 
1970 Average Number Payment• Payment• 
1967 Average HVNB Rejected in Percentage Less or Less or 




Total Down Payment Down Payment HVNB Payment Less $100 $250 
c.o 
1967 GMAC 
Borrowers 20 $569.39 $741.00 0 303 (6) 453 (9) 603 (12) 
1967 AAB 
Borrowers 18 $606.62 $615.68 2 333 (6) 393 (7) 643 (12) 
• Includes preceding column. 
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ing.35 The debtors might have been a wholly unpersuasive lot, who 
lacked reliable credit references. On the other hand, they might 
have persuaded him to lend even more money than he told us he 
would have loaned. Most important, our data show that the AAB 
and GMAC borrowers had no greater liabilities and no less income 
tion, the average difference between the down payments actually made by GMAC 
borrowers and those that HVNB would have required in 1967 on cars priced over 
$3,000 was substantially greater than the average difference between AAB down 





COMPARISON OF DOWN PAYMENT.! MADE TO GMAC AND AAB 
ON CARs PRICED $3000 OR MoRE WITH HVNB 
HYPOTHETICAL DoWN PAYMENTS 
Average Average HVNB No. of Loans on 
Actual Hypothetical Which HVNB Down 
Down Payment Down Payment Payment Smaller 
$456.16 $849.50 1 




Similarly, among all our respondents the average down payment made by HVNB 
borrowers on all new cars was 29.73 of the purchase price, the average down pay-
ment to AAB was 22.03 of the purchase price, and the average down payment to 
GMAC was 18.03 of the purchase price (see Item 5b in Appendix B). Finally, a dis-
proportionate number of lower-income GMAC borrowers in our sample (under $10,000 
total family income) were financing cars priced at $3,000 or more. Fourteen of the 
18 GMAC borrowers-about 783-with incomes under $10,000 bought cars priced 
over $3,000. Thirty per cent of the 47 low-income AAB borrowers bought cars costing 
at least $3,000. And 423 of the 29 low-income HVNB borrowers bought cars priced 
at $3,000 or more. 
What we conclude from these figures is that new-car buyers with smaller incomes 
who have decided to buy an expensive car gravitate to a lender with a reputation for 
easy credit. (When asked why they borrowed from GMAC, several of our respondents 
gave precisely this reason; see Questions III B-2 and IV B in Appendix A.) Many of 
these probably would have been refused the same loan at HVNB. Moreover, a buyer 
who is willing go deep into debt for the sake of a grossly uneconomical purchase 
may also be quite willing to take the most convenient loan rather than worry about a 
few extra dollars interest. 
35. As a check on the accuracy of the HVNB loan officer's judgment and on the 
importance of the information that we were not able to give him, we included 6 
borrowers from our sample who had borrowed from HVNB through this loan officer 
in 1967 and compared his 1970 decisions with the terms of the actual 1967 loans. As 
an additional check, we included 4 fictitious and exceptionally risky cases to help us 
judge whether or not the loan officer unrealistically lowered the bank's standards. 
The results of these checking procedures show that the minimum down payment 
the loan officer would require in 1970 on the basis of the information we gave him 
was somewhat lower than that actually paid by 4 out of the 6 persons who had 
actually borrowed from HVNB in 1967. The following table summarizes the data on 
which we base our assessment of the accuracy of the HVNB loan officer's estimates. 
(Footnote continued on next page) 
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or assets than did the HVNB borrowers.36 Apart from the fact that 
each of the 38 borrowers in our hypothetical sample who dealt with 
COMPARISON OF LOANS ACTUALLY MADE BY HVNB AND :MAXIMUM LOANS 
OFFERED BY HVNB LoAN OFFICER THREE YEARS LATER 
Actual 1967 








Average Over-all HVNB: 
Actual 
Down Payment 
(3 of Price) 





















(3 of Price) 







The loan officer would not accept any of the fictitious borrowers-who were all very bad 
risks. One of the 2 loans that he made in 1967 but said he would not make for the 
same amount when we presented him with the same information in 1970 was a loan 
to a self-employed businessman for an expensive car. The loan officer said that this is 
one of the "problem" situations that he handles very cautiously. Had he known that 
the individual had a reputation for sound credit or had he checked credit references, 
he probably would have been willing to offer this individual as much as he did in 
1967. Our inability to provide the loan officer with credit references and with the 
identity of the borrower, a local merchant, changed the outcome. Furthermore, the loan 
officer's tendency in 1970 to offer smaller down payments than were actually required 
in 1967 is consistent with the fact that borrowers frequently wish to borrow less than 
the maximum the bank is willing to lend and that we had asked the officer to estimate 
the maximum amount he would lend. In any event, only in exceptional cases was the 
loan officer v.illing to allow a borrower to put down less than 20-253 of the price-a 
percentage that the loan officer said the bank requires for low- and middle-priced 
cars-or 303 of the price-the amount the bank regularly requires for high-priced 
cars. Although we could check his accuracy only very generally, we conclude that the 
loan officer's standards were not unrealistically low; despite the absence of information 
-e.g., credit references-he gave us a reasonably accurate picture of what the bank 





INCOME OF REsPONDENTS 
(In Thousands of Dollars) 
0-5 5-7.5 7.5-10 10-12.5 12.5-20 20+ 
4.83 4.83 19.03 27.03 41.43 3.23 
5.23 18.73 22.83 23.93 18.73 lo.43 
4.93 11.53 31.23 13.13 23.03 16.43 





• Because percentage figures have been rounded off, printed figures do not neces-
sarily total 100.03. 
It should be noted that our sample does not include consumers with marginal 
incomes. By selecting only new-car loans we have doubtless excluded the ghetto 
dweller and the abject poor. 
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AAB or GMAC agreed to pay the maximum rate possible, we know 
nothing about them that suggests that they represented greater risks 
or that they were for any other reason less attractive borrowers. 
Some may argue that we dwell too long on an obvious truth-
namely, that the consumer market is horribly imperfect. We reject 
that argument. We believe it significant that a large minority and 
perhaps a majority of those who borrowed from the most expensive 
and least conservative creditor in the market could have had the 
same or nearly the same loan with the most conservative and least 
expensive creditor. Is it not remarkable that a majority of the new-
car buyers may have been paying 253 more interest than they had to 
pay? Certainly the bank loan officers most familiar with the market, 
with whom we spoke before we conducted the survey, painted a 
picture of the market-one in which high-risk customers were con-
centrated at GMAC and similar institutions-quite different from 
the one that we discovered. We also suspect that some of the pro-
ponents of disclosure legislation would not have thought the market 
to be as insensitive to price differences as it proved to be. An equally 
intriguing and more elusive question to which we now turn is why 
those apparently able to borrow at a significantly lower rate failed 
to do so. 
IV. LACK OF KNOWLEDGE THAT OTHERS OFFER A LOWER 
RATE WAS NoT THE PRINCIPAL DETERRENT FOR MOST 
PERSONS WHO FAILED To BORROW AT THE LOWER RATE 
A variety of facts suggests that the rate of interest charged on his 
loan is not an important fact in the eyes of the typical automobile 
buyer. First, our data confirm findings made elsewhere that con-
sumers are ignorant of rates (see Table 2).37 A majority of our 
sample-an overwhelming majority if one excludes the respondents 
who borrowed at HVNB-were ignorant of the interest rate that 
they were paying on their auto loans. When one combines this 
ignorance of rates with the fact that all of the persons interviewed 
had contracted for their loans within the year previous to the inter-
view and were still making payments on those loans, he is at least 
nudged toward the conclusion that the interest rate was not upper-
most in the borrowers' minds at the time the loans were arranged. 
37. See, e.g., F. JuSTER &: R. SHAY, supra note 6; Due, supra note 6; Hoskins, .supra 
note 6. 




















t Weighted by Lender (see note 24). 












A second fact consistent with the hypothesis that interest rate 
is comparatively unimportant to the credit buyer is the willingness 
of most respondents to allow the automobile dealer to arrange the 
loan rather than to shop for the lowest available rate. Altogether 
65.53 of our respondents and approximately 75.53 of all the 
borrowers at GMAC, AAB, and HVNB allowed the dealer to arrange 
the loan.38 While our sample is statistically representative of the 
borrowers of only 3 lenders in the county, the fact that most other 
large lenders in the area made loans through dealers at $6/100 add-on 
in 1967 leads us to the conclusion that at least 75.53 of all the new-
car loans in the Washtenaw County market are made through the 
dealer at or near the maximum rate permissible by law.39 
Among our respondents who allowed the dealer to arrange the 
loan, only 113 (14) made any prior inquiry elsewhere about loans. 
If the dealer at the point of contracting had said that the loan would 
be made at $7 /100 or even $8/100, is it plausible that these people 
would have gone elsewhere to borrow? There is certainly no evidence 
from our respondents to indicate that they would have done so. 
Also militating in favor of discounting interest rate as an impor-
tant factor-at least among those who accepted the loan offered by 
the lender-are the reasons given by respondents for allowing the 
38. The reason for the difference between the 2 figures is the double proportion of 
HVNB borrowers in our sample (see note 24 supra). The 75.53 figure is corrected to 
represent the true proportion of the borrowers of the 3 lenders. 
39. The loan officer at AAB stated that every car dealer in the county had some 
form of referral arrangement with at least I lender. He and the HVNB officials agreed 
that HVNB was one of the few exceptions to the general rule of "indirect" lending. 
A letter that a local auto-dealers association sent to HVNB's president shortly after 
that bank opened discloses how exceptional the HVNB policy is. That letter charac-
terized HVNB's direct-loan policy as shortsighted; it offered HVNB "membership" in 
the local combination in restraint of trade and forecast economic disaster for a bank 
that did not buy paper from dealers. 
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dealer to arrange the loan (see Figure I). The largest number of 
respondents said that they agreed to the loan arranged by the dealer 
because they had had previous experience with the creditor, AAB or 
GMAC. The second most frequent response was that of "conve-
nience." Well down the list of reasons was low cost. Conceivably, 
some of those people would have gone elsewhere had they known 
they were not getting a cheap loan; but we are skeptical. The pro-
pensity to deal again with a familiar creditor and the emphasis on 
the convenience of allowing the dealer to arrange the loan may be 
taken at face value as an indication of laziness or lack of interest in 
competing offers or as a sign of debtor insecurity about dealing with 
unfamiliar creditors. 
Fourth, there is an understandably high coincidence between 
the place where a borrower lived and the place where he borrowed 
(see Table 3). All 3 creditors have branches or dealer representatives 
in the city of Ann Arbor. HVNB, however, has branches only in Ann 
Arbor, andAAB has only 1 branch outside Ann Arbor. GMAC, on the 
other hand, makes loans through all General Motors dealers in the 
county. Ypsilanti, the second largest city in the county, is located 
about 4 miles from Ann Arbor (in the opposite direction from AAB's 
out-county branch) and does not have branch offices of either bank 
we studied. Over 803 of HVNB's borrowers lived in Ann Arbor, 
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• Because percentage figures have been rounded off, the printed figures do not 
necessarily total I00.03. 
AAB's customers lived in Ann Arbor and Dexter, the cities in which 
all of AAB's branches are located. In contrast, approximately 753 
of GMAC's business came from outside Ann Arbor or Dexter. The 
conclusion one draws from these data, of course, is that geographical 
location and the convenience associated with geographical proximity 
is an important factor in a borrower's decision about where to bor-
row. 
A final piece of evidence-indeed, the only direct evidence-that 
supports the conclusion that lack of knowledge was not the principal 
FIGURE I 
REAsONS GIVEN FOR BORROWING THROUGH AN AUTO DEALER• 
Always borrow 
this way 




















• HVNB is not included because only 2 of our 64 HVNB respondents had dealer-
made loans. Approximately 973 of all GMAC loans and about 623 of all AAB loans 
were arranged through the dealer. 
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deterrent to comparative shopping by debtors is our finding that 
approximately 293 of GMAC and AAB respondents knew of at 
least I lender in the county that loaned at a rate lower than the one 
they were paying. Some of these persons mentioned institutions from 
which they could not have borrowed-for example, the University 
of Michigan Employees' Credit Union-but most of them named 
lending institutions that loaned money to the general public. As our 
discussion in part V will show, this group of people who had the knowl-
edge but did not use it is by no means a group of unusually bad 
credit risks; nor were these debtors prevented from taking advan-
tage of the lower rate by any financial disadvantage that we could 
discover. 
We asked the 293 who knew about a lower rate of interest but 
did not take advantage of it this question: "Why didn't you borrow 
from the creditor offering the lower rate?" Their answers were con-
sistent with the theory that interest rate is outweighed by other con-
siderations in the minds of those buyers who know a lower rate and 
can weigh that knowledge against other factors (Figure 2). Some of 
these respondents were like the monkeys:40 they admitted fear of 
dealing with the new creditor who might have rejected them or 
required anxiety-producing credit-checking procedures. By way of 
justification, they emphasized strength of established ties to a famil-
iar or more convenient creditor. 
We are particularly suspicious of the "convenience" responses, 
the largest single category (443).41 We suspect that some, and per-
haps many, of the respondents used "convenience" as a euphemism 
for "The dealer is friendly, but I'm threatened by those stuffy 
bankers." Others may have used "convenience" as a graceful admis-
sion of surrender to dealer pressure.42 
40. See text following note 13 supra. 
41. Not only in our study but also in others, "convenience" responses predominate 
among explanations given by borrowers for using installment credit offered by the 
seller instead of bank credit. See OPINION REsEARCH CoRP., supra note 6. 
42. For the report of an undercover agent who sold cars for a short time, which 
describes the unscrupulous but effective pressures that a car dealer may apply to nail 
down a deal, see Rapoport, How I Made $193.85 Selling Cars, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, 
Jan. 1970, at 75. See also Shannon, The Baffling Facts About Shopping for a New 
Model Car in Detroit, Detroit Free Press, Jan. 25, 1970, § B, at I, col. I. 
Others have interpreted the "convenience" response and other data to mean that 
competition lies in areas other than interest rate. They also conclude that the market 
tends to divide on the basis of risks that creditors are willing to take instead of on 
the basis of rates. See Harper, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code: A Critical 
.&nalysis, 44 N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 53, 67-68 (1969). Our own data tend to confirm this inter-
pretation of convenience responses, but our data do not show that there are significant 
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FIGURE 2 
REAsONS 'WHY THOSE 'WHO KNEW OF A LOWER-COST LENDER 
DID NoT SEEK A LOWER-COST LOAN 
Convenience; 
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15.33 ____ _, 
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If it were somehow possible to provide money-cost information 
to all prospective new-car buyers before they arranged a purchase and 
loan, what would be the result? Nothing in our data indicates that 
such knowledge would have significantly changed the behavior of 
our respondents, and much in our data suggests that such knowledge 
differences in the risks presented by the borrowers to the 3 creditors we studied in 
terms of income and assets held. We have shown that the lowest-rate lender would 
have offered the same loans to most of the customers of the other 2. 
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would not have altered their behavior. The majority of the borrow-
ers in our sample were ignorant of the interest rate they were 
actually paying.43 All but a small minority bought credit with the 
car and did not shop.44 Most borrowed near home45 and stated rea-
sons quite unrelated to rates as a basis for their borrowing behavior.46 
Finally, and most disheartening, is the substantial minority who 
actually knew of an institution lending at lower rates than they en-
joyed but who did not stir themselves to borrow at the lower rate.47 
One is reminded of the statement attributed to a cigarette company 
executive on the cigarette cancer warning: "I think the American 
public is too intelligent to pay any attention to that type of warning." 
The classic rejoinder also fits: "In the long run the people can be 
counted on." 
v. How DID BORROWERS WHO WERE SENSITIVE TO INTEREST 
RATE DIFFERENCES CONTRAST WITH 
BORROWERS WHo WERE NoT? 
We began this study by seeking to determine whether a substan-
tial number of persons who had borrowed to finance the purchase of 
new cars could have obtained loans at interest rates lower than the 
ones that they were paying. Our interview with the loan officer at 
HVNB showed that a substantial proportion of those who had bor-
rowed from the other lenders could have obtained a lower-cost loan. 
Our second step consisted of looking at new-car buyers in our sample 
to see how many retained rate information. We found many who 
had information about low-cost loans but who did not seek loans at 
the lower rate. We tried to determine why these buyers did not shop 
for loans at the lower rate. The data presented above suggest that 
a variety of psychological, geographical, and economic factors governs 
the behavior of borrowers in the consumer loan market. On the basis 
of those factors, we will now attempt to distinguish the borrower who 
shops for the low-cost loan from his nonshopping counterpart. 
Most new-car buyers borrowing at the legal maximum rate had 
no knowledge of interest rates offered by lenders other than their 
43. See Table 2 supra. 
44. See note 38 supra and accompanying text. 
45. See Table 3 supra. 
46. See Figure I supra. 
47. See text preceding note 40 supra and Figure 2 supra. 
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own.48 Borrowers who were uninformed about competing lenders 
and who were unconcerned with interest rates or competition among 
lenders we will hereafter describe as "uninformed nonshoppers."49 
A small proportion (17.43) of the new-car buyers we interviewed 
did know that interest rates varied and selected a lender on that 
basis. These buyers may be called "shoppers."50 And a third group 
of respondents (29.03), whom we have already discussed,51 knew 
that at least one other lender in the county loaned money at a rate 
lower than the one that they were paying. They constitute a group of 
"informed nonshoppers."02 We may begin by examining the differ-
ences among these three groups. The differences may help us explain 
why some new-car buyers shop for loans, why some explicitly ignore 
an opportunity to obtain a loan at a lower rate, and why most seem 
completely unaware of interest rate differences. 
If one lets his imagination run, he can come up with a variety of 
hypothetical characteristics with which to identify those who shop 
and those who do not. A most obvious hypothesis is that the shoppers 
are more financially sophisticated than are the nonshoppers. We 
attempted to test this first hypothesis both by direct questioning and 
by asking each debtor about the type of assets that he owned; we 
assumed that debtors who dealt in stocks and bonds and who had 
several bank accounts would be more accustomed to thinking of 
money as a commodity to be purchased and sold. As our second 
hypothesis, we assumed that debtors with large incomes would be 
48. See Appendix A infra, question II J. 
49. The group that we will refer to as "uninformed nonshoppers" allowed the 
dealer to arrange their loan (Question II B in Appendix A), did not inquire elsewhere 
about the possibility of a loan (Question II B-4 in Appendix A), did not inquire about 
the possibility of a different loan even if they had borrowed from another creditor at 
another time (Questions II B-4 and II C-1 in Appendix A), did not switch creditors 
since the last car purchase for reasons related to the cost of the loan (Question III B 
in Appendix A), and did not patronize their current creditors because they offered 
cheap loans (Question IV C in Appendix A). 
50. The group that we will call "shoppers" includes those who borrowed where 
they did because the creditor offered cheaper loans (Questions II D-1 and IV B in 
Appendix A), who either switched to or stayed with a prior creditor because he 
offered a cheaper loan (Questions m B and C in Appendix A), and who were paying 
less than $6/100 add-on on their loan (taken from the financing statement-see Appen-
dix B). 
51. See text preceding note 40 supra and Figure 2 supra. 
52. The group that will be referred to in subsequent tables and text as the "in-
formed nonshoppers" was assembled by sorting out all respondents who said that 
they had heard of a lender who would lend at a rate of interest lower than the one 
that they were paying (Question II J in Appendix A), who was geographically within 
their reach, and who did not loan only to special groups-e.g., an employee credit 
union for which the respondent was ineligible (Question II J-4 in Appendix A). 
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more likely to shop for a low rate than would debtors with smaller 
incomes. A third hypothesis that we sought to test in our questioning 
was that the character of a debtor's job may be related to his pro-
pensity to shop--that is, a white-collar worker might be more likely 
to shop than a blue-collar one. Fourth, we sought to ascertain 
whether those debtors who shopped could be characterized as better-
educated than those who did not. 
A Financial Sophistication 
In order to obtain evidence of financial sophistication, and at 
the same time directly to test our respondents' propensity to shop for 
a low-cost loan, we asked the question: "If you were to pay $6 per 
100 on a loan, would you expect it to cost the same as interest at 
63?"53 Most of the shoppers (63.43) correctly answered "No"; 
46.03 of the informed nonshoppers gave the correct answer; and 
only 21.63 of the uninformed nonshoppers knew the proper re-
sponse.54 
We also reasoned that those respondents who owned stocks and 
bonds would be more sophisticated financially than those who did 
not, since ownership of such assets indicates experience in treating 
money as a commodity. Accordingly, we expected shoppers to be 
more likely than either group of nonshoppers to hold stocks and 
bonds (see Table 4). While 46.03 of the shoppers and 42.03 of the 
informed nonshoppers held such assets at the time they purchased 
their last new car, less than~ (22.83) of the uninformed nonshop-
pers owned stocks and bonds at the time of purchase. A larger pro-
portion of uninformed nonshoppers than of either other group held 
no substantial assets for investment. 
53. See Question II I-2 in Appendix A. 
54. ANSWERS TO THE QUESTION "IF You WERE To PAY $6 PER 100 ON A 
LOAN, WOULD You ExPEcr IT To COST THE SAME AS INTEREST AT 63?" 
Costs Costs Are Don't 
The Same Different Know Total• N 
Shoppers 17.13 63.43 19.43 99.93 41 
Informed 
Nonshoppers 28.63 46.03 25.43 100.03 50 
Uninformed 
Nonshoppers 39.23 21.63 39.23 100.03 66 
• Because percentage figures have been rounded off, the printed figures do not 
necessarily total 100.03. 
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TABLE 4 
AssETs HELD FOR INVESTMENT AT TIME OF Amo PURCHASE 
Per cent who Per cent who 
held stocks/ held real estate• Per cent who 
bonds or other held no assets 
Shoppers 46.03 4.93 49.83 
Informed 
Nonshoppers 42.03 10.03 48.03 
Uninformed 
Nonshoppers 22.83 19.73 57.53 
Total 
Nonshoppers 31.03 15.53 53.53 
X2 (rows 1 and 2) < I, not significant.55 
X2 (rows 1 and 3) = 8.74, p < .02. 












t Because percentage figures have been rounded off, the printed figures do not 
necessarily total 100.03. 
Among the uninformed nonshoppers, the percentage that had 
real-estate holdings nearly equalled the percentage that invested in 
stocks and bonds. In contrast, a similar comparison for both shoppers 
and informed nonshoppers reveals that far more of the respondents 
in these groups invested in stocks and bonds than in real estate or 
other assets. Thus, it appears that shoppers were more financially 
sophisticated than at least uninformed nonshoppers in terms of 
understanding interest rates and of kinds of investments. 
B. Income and Home Ownership 
Arguably, the higher a borrower's income, the more likely he is 
to have alternatives to borrowing at an add-on rate and to be inter-
ested in finding the add-on loan that compares most favorably to a 
loan at simple interest.56 Prior studies have contended that con-
sumers will absorb information when it is economically rational to 
do so and that consumers with a level of income high enough to give 
55. Chi-square statistics have been computed for each of the tables in this section. 
The level of significance for a X2 value, for example p < .05, may be interpreted as 
meaning that the numbers are so unevenly distributed in the table that such a dis-
tribution would occur less than 53 of the time by chance. For a significance level of 
p < .20, the distribution in the table would be obtained less than 1 in 5 times by 
chance. These statistics should be used as an aid to intention. They do not indicate 
what caused the distribution of numbers in the table or how strong the relationship 
between two variables may be if a relationship exists. The actual numbers are included 
with some reluctance, but they may be valuable when differences in percentages alone 
axe themselves misleading or inconclusive. 
56. F. JusrER &: R. SHAY, supra note 6, at 1-18. 
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them alternatives will remember interest rates and shop for low-cost 
loans.57 
If these arguments are correct, shoppers should have higher aver-
age incomes than nonshoppers. However, Table 5 shows that, while 
a slightly higher proportion of shoppers than nonshoppers had in-
comes above $15,000, a greater proportion also had incomes below 
$10,000. The mean income of both shoppers and nonshoppers fell 
between $10,000 and $12,499. Except for the te:µdency for shoppers 
to be concentrated at the extremes of the income distribution, a 
borrower's income does not appear to be related to his interest-rate 
sensitivity. A possible explanation for this failure of the statistics to 
bear out the theories of prior studies is that the incomes of the re-
spondents in our sample were higher and showed much less variation 
than the incomes of the population of Washtenaw County as a 
whole.58 Thus, by inadvertently limiting our study to an unusually 
high-income sample, we may have obscured some significant relation-
ships. A second possible explanation for the apparent lack of rela-
tionship between one's income level and his propensity to shop is 
that income makes little difference until a certain level is reached; 




$0-7,499 9,999 14,999 $15,000+ N.A.• Total N 
Shoppers 14.73 31.73 19.53 29.23 4.93 100.03 41 
Informed 
Nonshoppers 11.03 16.03 46.03 22.03 2.03 100.03 50 
Uninformed 
Nonshoppers 18.23 25.83 28.83 24.23 3.03 100.03 66 
Total 
Nonshoppers 16.43 22.63 36.23 23.23 2.63 100.03 116 
X2 (rows 1 and 2) = 7.59, p < .1. 
x2 (rows 1 and 3) < 2.5, not significant. 
• Not available. 
57. This theory also suggests that borrowers who do not shop for low-cost loans do 
shop for monthly payment sizes that fit their budgets. For these borrowers, the savings 
on interest is not as important as the drain on assets caused by monthly payments. 
F. JUSTER &: R. SHAY, supra note 6, at 1-18. 
58. The median income in Washtenaw County was $6,890 in 1967, and 23.93 of the 
families in the county had incomes over $10,000. U.S. BUR. OF nm CENsus, COUNTY &: 
CITY DATA BoOK 1967, A STATISTICAL ABsTRAcr SUPPLEMENT 183 (1967). Over half of the 
respondents in the survey reported incomes over $10,000. See note 36 supra. 
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But this theory does not help to explain the behavior of those whose 
income is below that threshold level; that is, it does not explain why 
some low- and moderate-income respondents shopped while others 
did not. 
Surprisingly, we found that about twice as many nonshoppers as 
shoppers owned their homes outright-that is, were no longer sub-
ject to liability for mortgage or rent payments (Table 6). A possible 
explanation for this finding is that people who have mortgages are 
more aware of money as a commodity. Also, because a home mort-
TABLE 6 
HOME OWNERSHIP 
Per cent Per cent Per cent 
who Own who Mortgage who Rent Total N 
Shoppers 12.23 61.03 26.83 100.03 41 
Informed 
Nonshoppers 22.03 50.03 28.03 100.03 50 
Uninformed 
Nonshoppers 25.83 50.03 24.23 100.03 66 
Total 
Nonshoppers 24.23 50.03 25.83 100.03 116 
X2 (rows I and 2) = 2.86, p < .3. 
X2 (rows I and 3) = 2.78, p < .3. 
gagor has an existing relationship with a mortgage institution, he 
may feel reasonably secure about going to that institution for a car 
loan and will find it convenient to do so. 
Other studies have generally succeeded in demonstrating that 
knowledge of the interest rate and finance charges that one pays is 
related to his assets and income.59 These studies have concluded that 
this relationship indicates that consumers use information available 
to them in an economically rational manner.60 Our data, however, 
are inconsistent with such a conclusion; they show that amount of 
income and extent of asset ownership are not directly related to 
retention or use of information about competing interest rates. 
Thus, it would appear that knowledge of one's own interest rate and 
knowledge of competing rates are two different aspects of rate 
sensitivity. 
59. See authorities cited in note 6 supra, especially F. JUSTER &: R:. SHAY, Due, and 
Hoskins. 
60. See F. JUSTER&: R. SHAY, supra note 6, at 10. 
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C. Type and Length of Job 
In our interview with the HVNB loan officer, we learned that a 
prospective borrower may be rated not only by his income, but also 
by the type and stability of his job. A white-collar borrower with a 
steady employment record may be a more attractive prospect to a 
bank than a blue-collar worker who is subject to layoffs. The loan 
officer also seemed to respect holders of white-collar jobs for reasons 
unrelated to income or to job stability. Therefore, occupation and 
length of employment at one's present job are factors that are re-
lated to the availability of a low-cost loan. Assuming that borrowers 
behave rationally-and that they are aware of these lender prefer-
ences--these factors should also be related to one's sensitivity to 
interest rates. Table 7 shows that there was indeed a relationship 
between the type of job held by our respondents and their propen-
sity to shop. The difference in occupation composition between the 
shoppers and the informed nonshoppers was not great, but the 
difference between shoppers and uninformed nonshoppers was quite 
substantial. Blue-collar workers constituted a significantly higher 
proportion of the uninformed nonshopper group than of either of 
the informed groups. 
TABLE 7 
TYPE OF JOB 
White Blue 
Collar• Collar Total N 
Shoppers 61.03 39.03 100.03 41 
Informed 
Nonshoppers 50.03 50.03 100.03 50 
Uninformed 
Nonshoppers 39.43 60.63 100.03 66 
Total 
Nonshoppers 44.03 56.03 100.03 116 
X2 (row 1 and 2) = l.ll, p < .28. 
X2 (rows 1 and 3) = 5.54, p < .02. 
• Includes students. 
These results seem to indicate that persons having information 
about competing interest rates are more likely to be white-collar than 
blue-collar workers and that shoppers tend to be white-collar workers. 
Differences in educational background, which are discussed in the 
next section, may partially explain these results. These results may 
also be due to the fact that rate information may be more readily 
available to persons who associate with the best credit risks. Forty-six 
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per cent of the informed nonshoppers in our sample had heard of 
the lower-cost lender through a friend or co-worker;61 if the lower-
cost lenders were already lending largely to white-collar workers, it 
is likely that information about these lenders would be spread to 
other white-collar workers more effectively than to blue-collar work-
ers. 
On the average, the shoppers in our sample had held their 
current jobs for a shorter period of time than had the informed 
nonshoppers (see Table 8). About the same proportion of both 
groups had held their current jobs for more than 5 years. Much 
greater proportions of both shoppers and informed nonshoppers had 
held their jobs for more than 5 years than had the uninformed 
nonshoppers. On the other hand, more shoppers than either in-
formed or uninformed nonshoppers had held their jobs for less than 
2 years. These ambiguous findings lead to the conclusion that job 
TABLE 8 
LENGTH OF SERVICE IN PrulsENT JOB 
More than 
0-2 Years 2-5 Years 5 Years Total N 
Shoppers 45.03 10.03 45.03 100.03 40 
Informed 
Nonshoppers 30.03 24.03 46.03 100.03 50 
Uninformed 
Nonshoppers 31.83 31.83 36.43 100.03 66 
Total 
Nonshoppers 31.03 28.53 40.53 100.03 116 
X2 (rows 1 and 2) = 6.94, p < .05. 
X2 (rows I and 3) = 9.61, p < .01. 
stability is not a very important factor either in the acquisition of 
price information or in the propensity to act on such information. 
Therefore, the fact that shoppers tend to be white-collar workers 
cannot be explained by the fact that white-collar employment is 
more stable than blue-collar work. It is necessary to look at some 
other characteristic of white-collar employees-such as their sophisti-
cation, education, place of residence, or access to information 
through informal channels--to explain why they constitute such a 
large proportion of the informed groups. 
61. Another 253 read advertisements, and the remaining 293 learned of the lower-
rate lender in a variety of other ways (e.g., through a professional credit counselor or 
by having borrowed from the lender at some time in the past). See Question II J-3 in 
Appendix A. 
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D. Education 
The relationship between occupation and shopping suggests that 
we look next at another socio-economic variable-education. Table 
9 shows that, in general, the shoppers in our survey had achieved 
higher levels of education than had either group of nonshoppers. In 
fact, nearly 663 of the shoppers had attended college. The median 
TABLE 9 
EDUCATION 
Less Than High School 
12 Years (12) 
Shoppers 14.73 19.53 
Informed 
Nonshoppers 16.63 39.63 
Uninformed 
Nonshoppers 45.03 25.83 
Total 
Nonshoppers 32.03 32.03 
X2 (rows l and 2) = 4.21, p < .07. 
x2 (rows l and 3) = 15 +, p < .001. 
Some College 
(12+) Total• N 
65.83 100.03 41 
43.83 100.03 48 
29.33 100.13 58 
35.83 99.83 106 
• Because percentage figures have been rounded off, the printed figures do not 
necessarily total 100.03. 
educational attainment for the 2 groups of nonshoppers (12 years) 
was slightly less than that for the county as a whole (12.2 years).62 
While it is tempting to interpret the differences in levels of educa-
tion as a reflection of a difference in sophistication between shoppers 
and nonshoppers, our discussion below will show that the differences 
in education are also related to place of residence. 
E. Place of Residence 
A major difficulty in the interpretation of our data on the rela-
tive sophistication of shoppers and nonshoppers is that all of HVNB's 
branches are located in Ann Arbor. Because of the size of the 
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor has a large proportion of 
white-collar workers63 and a large percentage of highly educated 
persons.~4 Therefore, the relationships that we found between 
knowledge and shopping and our respondents' educational attain-
ments and job type might also be explained in part by distance 
62. COUNTY &: CITY DATA BooK, supra note 58, at 182. 
63. Id. at 505. Of the employed persons in Ann Arbor, 66.23 hold white-collar 
jobs. The comparable national figure is 50.43. 
64. Id. The median number of years of education for Ann Arbor residents is 13.7 
and for all United States residents is 12.2. 
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of the residence of borrowers from each of the 3 creditors. It may be 
that the best banking opportunities are located near white-collar 
places of work and residence. That possibility prevents us from 
drawing the conclusion that shopping for low-cost loans is related 
to education and occupation. If proximity to a low-cost lender is the 
primary factor in a new-car buyer's decision to borrow from that 
lender, differences in level of education and white-collar employ-
ment may be indicative merely of the fact that HVNB is located only 
in Ann Arbor. Table 10 shows there was indeed a correlation be-
TABLE 10 
REsPONDENTS LmNG IN ANN .ARBOR 
Per Cent N X2 (shoppers x nonshoppers) 
Shoppers 78.03 41 
Informed 
Nonshoppers 58.03 50 X2 (rows 1 and 2) = 3.66, 
p < .06 
Uninformed 
Nonshoppers 45.53 66 X2 (rows 1 and 3) = 20+ 
p < .001 
Total 
Nonshoppers 50.93 116 
tween shopping and our respondents' places of residence. Moreover, 
controlling the place-of-residence factor dramatically reduces the dif-
ference in the educational background, for example, between shop-
pers and nonshoppers. If we consider only the Ann Arbor residents 
in the 3 groups, the difference in percentage of shoppers and non-
shoppers respectively with more than 12 years of education declines 
from 303 (see Table 9) to 103 (see Table 11 ). 
TABLE 11 
EDUCATION OF REsPONDENTS WITH REsIDENCE IN fu'IN .ARBOR 
12 Years 12 Years 
or less or more N X2 (shoppers x nonshoppers) 
Shoppers 34.03 66.03 32 
Informed 
Nonshoppers 41.43 58.63 29 X2 = .3, not sig. 
Uninformed 
Nonshoppers 46.63 53.43 30 X2 = 1, not sig. 
Total 
Nonshoppers 44.03 56.03 59 
Comparative analysis of our 3 groups of respondents has allowed 
us to identify some characteristics that seem to be associated with 
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borrowers who shop, some that seem to be associated with borrowers 
who know of competing interest rates but do not take advantage of 
them, and some that seem to be associated with borrowers who 
neither shop nor have information.65 We found that the amount of 
the debtor's income and the type of assets he held had no significant 
relationship to his status as a shopper or nonshopper; in fact, the 
nonshoppers earned slightly more money than did the shoppers. In 
contrast, we found that those persons with some sophistication in 
interpreting interest rates were much more likely to shop. Not sur-
prisingly, we also found that a borrower who knew the rate of 
interest he was paying was far more likely to be a shopper than a 
nonshopper, that a highly educated person was more likely to be a 
shopper than was one who was not highly educated, and that shop-
pers were more likely to be white-collar workers than blue-collar 
workers. While we offer hypotheses for the independent effects that 
each of these variables has on shopping, we cannot sort out the 
relative contribution of each. Our data strongly suggest that shop-
pers tend to be middle-class consumers, consumers with fairly con-
servative buying patterns. From our sample, such consumers seem to 
enjoy a variety of advantages: they live near the low-cost lenders, they 
are more likely to understand the meaning of the add-on rate of 
interest, and, as may be inferred from our interview with a loan offi-
cer, banks are likely to pay greater respect to them because of their 
white-collar jobs. 
The kindest thing that can be said for these findings is that they 
are interesting but inconclusive. A variety of factors have con-
founded our search for certainty. The fact that HVNB, the low-cost 
lender, is located only in Ann Arbor, a town whose population has 
a disproportionately high level of education, causes us some fear that 
in reporting that shoppers are highly educated persons we are really 
65. In reading this discussion of the differences between shoppers and both groups 
of nonshoppers, one should keep in mind that we have been considering the composi-
tion of each of the groups and not the likelihood that a white-collar worker or an 
individual with an income under $10,000 will be a shopper. The group that we label 
"shoppers" is so small-about 17.5% of our sample-that its members are a small 
minority of all those new-car buyers with each of the characteristics we have discussed. 
What we have shown is that an individual with certain demographic characteristics--
such as high income and white-collar job-is more likely to be a shopper than is one 
not possessing such characteristics. But it does not follow that the possession of such 
characteristics makes it more likely that a particular individual will be a shopper than 
a nonshopper. We have not compared percentages of white-collar workers in each of 
the 3 groups because our 3 groups combined do not include all respondents in our 
sample and the percentages would not give proportions of a statistically representative 
sample of white- and blue-collar workers. Our 3 comparison groups comprise about 
65% of our entire sample; the remaining 35% do not fall into any of the groups. 
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only saying that a lot of college graduates live in Ann Arbor. 
Furthermore, we are inclined to qualify our figures on income 
because we believe the HVNB sample included a disproportionately 
high number of students who will shortly be high-income earners-
persons who have all of the attributes of a high-income earner but 
are now classified as low- or no-income persons because they are still 
law or medical students. We must conclude this analysis, then, with 
a bit of a disclaimer-we are not sure that our questions plumbed 
the depths as well as they might have. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Our principal conclusion is that the consumer loan market, at 
least as it is evidenced in the market for new-car loans in Washtenaw 
County, is a grossly imperfect one-grossly imperfect, that is, if one 
regards it as a market whose single item of cost is the rate of interest 
one pays. We found that many who live in the county failed to seek 
the lowest-cost loan for which they could have qualified. We con-
clude that the lack of knowledge of the lower interest rate was not 
the principal deterrent to procuring such a loan, but that a variety of 
factors, in various combinations, kept the bulk of our respondents 
from obtaining a lower-cost loan. 
The results of our study suggest that, at least with regard to auto 
loans, the disclosure provisions of the Truth-in-Lending Act will 
be largely ineffective in changing consumer behavior patterns.66 
Certainly the Act will not improve the status of those who already 
know that lower rates are available elsewhere. And we discovered no 
evidence that knowledge of the interest rate-which, even under the 
Act will usually come after a tentative agreement to purchase a 
specified car has been reached67-will stimulate a substantial per-
centage of consumers to shop for a lower rate elsewhere. If there 
will be a beneficiary of truth-in-lending, our data indicate that he 
will be a middle-class borrower, the man with a better-than-average 
job and education, not the blue-collar worker. Our data suggest that 
even the relatively affiuent blue-collar employee will not benefit from 
rate disclosure; presumably, the low-income blue-collar employee 
will benefit even less. 
66. Preliminary confirmation from a more recent survey appeared in the N.Y. Times, 
Feb. 7, 1971, § A, at 24, col. I. which reported that a Federal Reserve Board survey of 
consumers' knowledge of interest rates showed slight improvement between 1969 and 
1970. 
67. See note 12 supra and accompanying text. 
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If truth-in-lending is not a panacea for the imperfections in the 
market, then what should legislatures do? One desirable act would 
be to break down the barriers that now exist to market entry by new 
lenders. Although our study shows that there are many who would 
not benefit from the entry of new and lower-cost creditors, none of 
the many respondents who borrowed at a low cost from HVNB could 
have so benefited prior to its entry into the market in 1963. The 
addition of new lenders, of course, does not ensure that there will 
be rate competition. Moreover, one suspects that rate competition 
will always be limited to big-ticket items. There is always the chance, 
however, that the newcomer will see some advantage in offering a 
rate differential. 
Another possibility for new legislation would be an expansion 
of the truth-in-lending laws to require lenders who advertise to dis-
close in their advertisements the rates at which they make various 
loans. The current law provides that lenders who undertake to 
advertise interest rates must disclose those rates in specified terms;68 
but lenders remain free to ignore rates entirely in their advertising. 
Indeed, a recent GMAC television advertisement features a heavy-
breathing jogger. The point of the ad is that it is much more con-
venient to come to GMAC to buy the car and borrow in one spot 
than it is to run to one place for insurance, to another place for a 
loan, and to a third place for the car. Perhaps GMAC should be 
required in such an advertisement to disclose the rate at which it 
will lend against new cars. However, our findings make us rather 
pessimistic about the effectiveness of disclosures, whenever and how-
ever made, in today's market. 
Widespread public education, through television and through 
the schools, offers greater possibilities. Such education might disclose 
some of the tricks of the trade, might teach the public how to com-
pute interest charges, and might encourage more consumers to seek 
out lower-cost lenders. Of course, the sample of respondents that 
we interviewed were not typical of all consumers; nor did they 
represent some of the classes of consumers to whom most concern 
should be directed. In this sense we are talking only about con-
sumers who are relatively well-off. It is quite unclear whether rela-
tively affiuent consumers like those we interviewed-even armed 
with rate information and brainwashed by television instruction 
about finding cheap loans-would change their behavior. If they do 
68. Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.IO(d)(l) (1970). 
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not, then we suppose that is the consumers' business. If dealing with 
"Harry" down at the local dealership instead of with some unknown 
banker, if doing one-stop shopping instead of two- or three-stop shop-
ping, and if closing the entire deal on the car at once are all worth 
$120 or $130 to the consumer, then why shouldn't we let him spend 
his money that way?a9 
69. It is worthwhile to emphasize the differences in the authors' approaches to 
consumer protection. 'While the data show that most of our respondents were finan-
cially well·off, the imperfections that we found in the market do not necessarily reflect 
either a lack of interest in savings or some other completely voluntary inaction. It is 
true that a consumer need not save his money. But a less well-educated, blue-collar 
consumer may show justifiable reluctance to deal with bankers and prefer to deal 
instead with "easy-credit" lenders. The HVNB loan officer's statement that he judged 
partly on appearance and white-collar job is a tip-off to some of the more subtle 
pressures in the credit market that we could not measure. Distances from places of 
work and residence to the lower-priced creditors is another. Moreover, even if the 
lowest-cost loans were equally available to all, it would seem desirable in a credit-
oriented society to teach people-especially those with limited resources-how to use 
credit wisely. In the alternative, or as a supplement, a form of regulation that both 
facilitates the granting of credit to all and that transfers some of the cost of granting 
credit to the general public either through better protection or direct subsidy might 
be helpful. Until these and other remedies are tried, the "ho-hum" attitude toward 
consumer credit seems inappropriate. 
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APPENDIX A 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR DEBTORl 
(Do not accept other family members.) 
I am from the University of Michigan Law 
School. You probably received a letter which said that we would be 
calling. As we said in the letter, we are doing a study of consumer 
credit in Washtenaw County and of the attitudes and plans of con-
sumers. We have selected your name by chance from a list of people 
who bought late model cars in 1967. If you will give me a few minutes 
of your time in helping me fill out this questionnaire it will greatly 
help our study. All information will be used anonymously. No one's 
name will ever appear in the report. We will be happy to send you a 
copy of the final report if you want. In fact, it may help you the next 
time you buy a car. 
Code 













































1. Indicating the aggregate of all answers given. 
2. Not weighted to compensate for the double proportion of HVNB borrowers. 
8. Not available. 
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Frequency Per cent 
Other 2 0.9 
N.A. 5 2.1 
F. Sex: 
Male 195 83.03 
Female 34 14.5 
N.A. 6 2.5 
G. Number of Children Living at Home: 
0 75 31.93 
1 36 15.3 
2 51 21.7 
3 22 9.4 
4 17 7.2 
5 4 1.7 
6 3 1.3 
7 2 0.9 
8+ 2 0.9 
N.A. 23 9.8 
II. First I would like to talk about the general details of the last car 
purchase you made. 













B. (If at GMAC or AAB) Did the dealer arrange the loan? If no, 
go to C. 
Yes 
No 











If yes: I. Was everything taken care of at the dealer's office or did you 
go to the GMAC/AAB office? 
Yes 
No 
Dealer did not arrange loan 









2. Did you sign the contract on the same visit to the dealer's 
when you orally agreed to buy the car? 
Yes 80 
No 47 
Dealer did not arrange loan 102 
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3. If you had gotten your loan somewhere else, do you think 




Dealer did not arrange loan 









4. Did you inquire elsewhere about the possibility of a loan? 
Yes 16 7.03 
No 115 48.9 
Dealer did not arrange loan 102 43.4 
Don't know, N.A. 2 0.8 
If yes: a. Where? 
HVNB 2 0.93 
AAB 3 1.3 
Other 11 4.8 
b. Why didn't you borrow there? 
Not cheaper 7 3.03 
Present creditor 
more convenient 2 0.9 
Dealer pressure I 0.4 
Other 4 1.7 
Dealer did not arrange or did 
not inquire elsewhere 218 92.8 
Don't know, NA. 3 1.2 
If no: a. Is there some reason why you did not inquire elsewhere? 
Convenient to do business 
this way, short on time 
Have dealt with this creditor 
before 
Dealer pressure 
Present creditor is cheapest 
Low credit rating-had no 
choice 
Other 
Dealer did not arrange or in-
quired elsewhere 

















b. Did the dealer either encourage or discourage you from in-
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Don't know, N.A. 5 2.1 
i. How? Number of 
responses 10 
If HVNB or if dealer did not arrange the loan: 
C. Do you think that if you had financed through the dealer he 
would have sold you the automobile at a different price? 
Yes 16 6.73 
No 70 29.8 
Dealer arranged loan 125 53.2 
Don't know, N.A. 24 10.2 
I. Did the dealer offer to arrange a loan? 
Yes 52 22.13 
No 50 21.3 
Dealer arranged loan 126 53.6 
Don't know, N.A. 6 2.5 





Same 32 13.6 
No 50 21.3 
Dealer arranged loan 126 53.6 
Don't know, N.A. 6 2.5 
2. (If not financed at HVNB) Did you mention HVNB? 
No respondent mentioned HVNB 
3. If the dealer made a competitive offer, why didn't you 
accept it? 
Easier not to 
Cheaper not to 
Prefer to do it myself 
Hostile to car dealers 
Other 
No competitive offer, or 
dealer arranged loan 























I. (If no or if financed at GMAC) Is there some reason why 
you did not finance the car at your regular bank? 
Easier to borrow from present 
creditor 
Cheaper 
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Had contact with this cred-
itor before 
Other 





E. How far do you live (work) from the dealer? 















F. How far do you live (work) from your regular bank? 
0-1 mile ll5 48.93 
1-5 84 35.7 
5-10 15 6.4 
IO+ 12 5.4 
Don't know, N.A. 9 3.8 
G. (If financed at bank other than regular bank) How far do you 
live (work) from the bank where you financed the car? 
0-1 mile 8 3.43 
~ 16 u 
~O 7 M 
IO+ 12 5.2 
Financed through regular 
bank 
Don't know, N.A. 
121 
71 

















I. Do you know what interest rate banks are paying on savings? 
3.53 9 3.83 
~ « I~ 
4.5 65 27.7 
5.0 45 19.1 
5.5 19 8.1 
M+ l M 
Don't know, N.A. 52 22.l 
I. Do you know if it is computed on the same basis? 
Respondent says yes 17 7.23 
Respondent says no or gives 
explanation I04 «.2 
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Other wrong answer 27 11.6 
Don't know, N.A. 87 37.0 
2. If you were to pay $6 per hundred on a loan, would you 
expect it to cost you the same as interest at 63? 
Respondent says yes 67 28.53 
Respondent says no or gives 
explanation 94 40.0 
Other wrong answer 28 12.0 
Don't know, N.A. 46 19.5 
J. Do you know of anyone in Washtenaw County who lends at 
a lower rate than you borrowed? 
Yes 
No 

















2. Did you ask about the possibility of borrowing there? 
Yes 5 2.13 
No 53 22.6 
Don't know anyone lower 173 73.6 
N.A. 3 1.7 
3. How did you find out about 
mouth, ads, etc.) 
Word of mouth, general 
the lower rates? (word of 
knowledge 19 8.13 
Friend or co-worker 
Professional advice 
Regular prior contact 
Ad 
Other 
Don't know anyone with 
lower rate 
Don't know, N.A. 
4. Why didn't you borrow there? 
Took dealer's advice 
Did not believe or trust 
Respondent is high credit 
risk 
Present arrangement is more 
convenient 
Inconvenience-respondent 
believes low-cost creditor 
requires more credit ref-
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Impossibility-creditor is in 
another city, lends only to 
members, etc. 
Don't know anyone lower 










K. Do you read the Ann Arbor News regularly? The Ypsilanti 
Press? 
Ann Arbor News 166 70.63 
Ypsilanti Press 26 11.1 
Neither 28 11.9 
Both 12 5.1 
N.A. 3 1.3 
If yes: I. Have you ever noticed ads concerning rates? 
Yes 98 41.73 
No 83 35.3 
Don't know, N.A., don't read 
paper 40 17.1 
If yes: a. Who was the advertiser(s)? 
HVNB 76 32.33 
AAB 8 3.4 
Other 14 6.0 
GMAC 
b. Do you remember the rates advertised? 
Yes-4.03 or below 6 2.63 
Yes-4.5 37 15.7 
Yes-5.0 7 3.0 
Yes-5.5+ 9 3.8 
No 45 19.1 
Recalls ad was for cheap loan 4 1.7 
N.A., does not read paper, or 
did not see ads 127 54.1 
L. Do you know the total amount of the finance charge on your 
loan? 
Respondent's guess was three 




. 7 5-1.25 times 
.50-.75 times 
less than .50 finance charge 
Actual finance charge una-
vailable 
Don't know and did not guess 
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A. Have you ever dealt with ------- before? 
dealer 
I. l£ yes, did he arrange your financing before? 
2. If no, when you bought your car from other dealers, did 
did they arrange your financing? 
Yes, same dealer arranged 
loan 43 18.33 
Yes, same dealer did not ar-
range 33 14.0 
Yes, different dealer who ar-
ranged loan 62 26.4 
Yes, different dealer who did 
not arrange loan 50 21.3 
Never bought new car before 43 18.3 
N.A. 4 1.7 
3. If no, why did you have the dealer arrange it this time? 
Dealer did not arrange last 



















B. Did you deal with ------- when you previously 
bought a new car? 
Yes 
No 
bank or GMAC 
Never bought new car before 









I. If no, can you tell me why you switched to _____ ? 
bank or 
GMAC 
(convenience, lower rates, service, dealer influencing) 
Lower interest 20 8.53 
Convenience 16 6.8 
Dealer's recommendation 8 3.4 
Other 20 8.5 
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2. If yes, why did you stay with the same company? 
Convenient or the present 
creditor is regular bank 45 19.13 
Familiar with this creditor 
and trust him 47 20.0 
Lower interest rate 15 6.4 
Dealer's recommendation 9 3.8 












I. If yes, did you consult them about financing the car? 
Consulted 15 6.43 
Did not consult 136 57.9 
Never borrowed from another 
creditor or N.A. 84 35.7 
2. Why or why not? 
Respondents who consulted another creditor: 
Know and trust him 5 
Gave him first chance be-
cause borrowed there be-
fore 
Respondent was turned down 




borrowed before, or N.A. 220 93.6 
Respondents who did not consult another creditor: 
Did not consult because: 
Other more expensive or 
tougher on late payments 
Fear of refusal 
Convenience 
Dealer pressure 
Other creditor does not make 
auto loans or is not local 
bank 
Consulted other, never bor-













Do you work during banking hours? 
Yes 179 78.23 
No 43 17.3 
Don't know banking hours 13 5.5 
I. What hours do you work? 
Day shift ll2 47.73 
Night or afternoon shift 6 2.6 
N.A. ll7 49.7 
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IV. Future Transactions 
A. When you buy your next car, do you think you will borrow 
from ? 
bank or GMAC 
Yes 
No 
Pay cash next time 









B. Is there anything you particularly like about ? 
bank or GMAC 
C. Is there anything you particularly dislike about ? 
No likes, no complaints 
Complaints about loan ser-
vice 
Satisfied customer 
Satisfied with loans (specific-
ally) 
This creditor easier on late 
payments, or easy credit 
Mixed reaction-some likes, 
some complaints 

















D. Have you recommended ------- to anyone? 
bank or GMAC 
I. If yes, what did you recommend? 
Recommended generally to 
relative 3 I.33 
Recommended generally to 
friend 1 0.4 
Recommended loan service to 
anyone 34 14.4 
Other recommendations 52 22.l 
No recommendations 140 59.6 
Don't know, N.A. 5 2.1 
E. Has anyone recommended any other bank or finance company 
to you? If yes, what did they recommend about it? 
Recommended HVNB loans 9 3.83 
Recommended HVNB for any 
other reason 11 4. 7 
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Recommended other credi-
tor's loan service 
Recommended other credi-
tor for any other reason 
No recommendations 












V. The final set of questions concerns the kind of information 
------- asked of you when they decided that you were 
bank or GMAC 
a good borrower. We are trying to find out how the banks decide 
whom they will finance and whom they will not finance. As I 
said before, the information you give will be strictly confidential, 
and your name will never appear. We are just trying to find out 
how banks and finance companies work. 
A. How far have you gone in school? (Hand card to person.) 
Less than 6th grade 3 1.33 
~ 21 ~ 
9-11 27 11.5 
High school graduate 65 27.7 
13-15 30 12.8 
16+, college graduate 73 31.l 
N.A. 16 6.8 
B. What was your job(s) at the time you purchased your car? 
1. Who was your employer(s) at the time of purchase? 
Not Coded 
2. How long had you been working there at the time of 
purchase? 
Less than 1 year 36 15.33 
1-2 27 11.5 
2-5 54 23.0 
5-10 35 14.9 
10+ 64 27.2 
Unemployed or student 13 5.5 
N.A. 6 2.5 
3. What kind of work did you do there at the time of 
purchase? 
Salaried professional 36 15.33 
Salaried engineer 8 3.4 
Self-employed professional 5 2.1 
Self-employed manager 18 7.7 
Salaried management 22 9.4 
Other white collar 21 8.9 
Semi-skilled or skilled blue 
collar 41 17.4 
Unskilled blue collar 68 28.9 
N.A. 3 1.3 
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C. Do you: 
1. Own your own house? 











D. Did you own any other assets at the time of the purchase? 
Stocks or bonds 8 3.43 
Checking account only 23 9.8 
Savings account 88 37.4 
Real property and savings ac-
count 27 11.5 
Stocks or bonds and some 
savings 60 25.5 
Real property and stocks or 
bonds 4 1.7 
Real property, stocks or 
bonds, and savings 15 6.4 
N.A. 7 3.0 
Life insurance 
Less than $15,000 30 12.83 
15-30,000 16 6.8 
30-50,000 12 5.1 
50,000+ 7 3.0 
Did not or would not give 
amount 134 57.0 
No life insurance 27 11.5 
N.A. 9 3.8 
E. (If respondent had savings or stocks) 
1. Some people use their savings or sell stock to purchase 
an automobile. Why did you choose instead to borrow? 
Easier to do so 7 3.03 
Cheaper in the long run, or 
it would establish my 
credit 28 11.9 
Reluctance to use savings 71 30.2 
Dealer pressure 
Did not have enough savings 68 28.9 
Other 8 3.4 
Used savings 3 1.3 
Don't know 12 5.1 
N.A., or no savings 29 12.3 
2. a. If the interest on your loan had been 123 per year, 
would you have used your savings or sold your stock in-
stead of borrowing? 
b. Even if the monthly payment would have been the 
same? 
Yes, would do different to 
both parts 105 44.73 
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Yes to part a; no, would do 
same to part b 8 3.4 
No, would do same to both 
parts; interest is the same 
as mine 56 23.9 
Other 4 1.7 
Don't know, N.A., no sav-
ings, or savings too small 
to matter 62 26.4 
F. If no savings, stocks, or bonds: 
If the interest on your loan had been 123 per year instead of 
what you are paying, would you have acted differently in 
buying your car or getting your loan (e.g., put off purchase, 
purchase cheaper car, etc.)? 
Yes, would not have bor-
rowed 2 0.93 
Yes, would have put off pur-
chase 23 9.8 
Yes, other IO 4.3 
No, no change 16 6.8 
Had savings, or N .A. 184 78.3 
G. Did your wife (husband) work at the time of the purchase? 
(kind of work, etc.) 
Salaried professional 11 4.73 
Salaried engineer 
Self-employed professional 
Self-employed manager 3 1.3 
Salaried manager 3 1.3 
Other white collar 2 0.9 
Skilled and semi-skilled 3 1.3 
Unskilled 47 20.0 
Does not work 136 57.8 
N.A. 30 12.8 
H. What was her (his) income category? 
Under $3,000 3 1.33 
3,000-4,999 12 5.1 
5,000-7,499 3 1.3 
7,500-9,999 4 1.7 
10,000-12,499 
12,500-14,999 1 0.4 
15,000-19,999 1 0.4 
20,000 and up 1 0.4 
Does not work 136 57.8 
N.A. 74 31.9 
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I. Into which category did your family income fall at the time 
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APPENDIX B 
INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM FINANCING STATEMENTsl 
I. Name of Debtor: 
2. Address of Debtor: 
3. Phone number: 
4. Type of car and model: 
5. a) Total price + insurance: 
Code Frequency Per cent 
$0-1800 I 0.43 
1801-2200 24 10.2 
2201-2500 17 7.2 
2501-2800 39 16.6 
2801-3000 27 11.5 
3001-3200 28 11.9 
3201-3500 29 12.3 
3501-4200 25 10.6 
4201+ 16 6.8 
N.A.2 28 11.3 
b) Down payment or trade-in: 
$0 8 3.43 
1-200 18 7.7 
201-300 29 12.3 
301-500 34 14.5 
501-700 37 15.7 
701-1000 28 11.9 
1001-1500 33 14.0 
1501+ 20 8.5 
N.A. 28 11.3 
c) Total time balance: 
$0-1000 2 0.93 
1001-1600 22 9.4 
1601-2000 25 10.6 
2001-2600 54 23.0 
2601-3000 39 16.6 
3001-3400 29 12.3 
3401-4200 38 16.2 
4201+ IO 4.3 
N.A. 16 6.8 
I. See note 16 supra and accompanying text. 
2. Not available. Some financing statements included only the minimum amount 
of information required by statute. See note 16 supra. In most cases, a copy of the 
entire security agreement had been filed. 
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6. Total number of months over which payments are to be made: 
Less than 6 mos. 4 1.73 
6-12 mos. 11 4.7 
12-18 mos. 6 2.6 
18-24 mos. 24 10.2 
24-36 mos. 174 74.0 
N.A. 16 6.8 
7. Amount of monthly payments: 
$ 0-50 12 5.13 
51-60 27 11.5 
61-70 31 13.2 
71-80 34 14.5 
81-90 34 14.5 
91-IOO 26 II.I 
IOI-110 20 8.5 
111-150 25 I0.6 
150+ 8 3.4 
N.A. 18 7.6 
8. Amount of last payment if more than $1 different: 
9. Name and address of assignee: 
IO. Name of cosigner, if any: 
II. Contract signed by dealer: Yes 154 65.53 
No 58 24.7 
N.A. 23 9.8 
